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Beitrag vom 12.09.2015

Graensengrenzen Blog
https://wordpress.com/post/85499405/new

German Africa Policy: 10 Hypotheses

Robert Kappel

Based on an evaluation of cooperation experiences of the last decade and new economic and
political challenges we formulate ten hypotheses. They underline that Germany’s Africa policy is ripe
for a change and a repositioning:

1. Germany should no longer focus on development cooperation. This no longer adequately
addresses the trends, speeds, and dynamics in Africa. Africa should not be reduced to a site for
charity activities: it is a strategically important continent. A new German policy on Africa should
create reasonable consistency between new programs and key content in German policy per se, as
well as with normative agreements with European or multilateral institutions. Such a policy should
offer a practicable coherence between the traditional spheres of development, foreign and security
policy, economic and trade policy, and domestic (migration) and environmental policy. Consistency
between national goals and international agreements will reinforce the reliability of German policy.

2. For different countries, different approaches and measures must be identified. Special
emphasis should be given to democratic middle powers. On the one hand, democratic middle
powers are middle-income countries with growing middle classes and rising market sizes. On the
other hand, they radiate in their respective regions, are attractive to neighboring countries and
citizens, can export a successful model, and support growth and export growth. Cooperating with
these countries will also help to transfer peace and stability. Middle powers with a democratic
record are South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, and Tanzania. Authoritarian middle powers like
Ethiopia, Cameroon, and Angola should not be Germany’s main partners in Africa.

3. Fragile states, very small states, and LICs are in need of a separate agenda that would entail
the strengthening of institutions, reducing fragility, support for SMEs, and an employment agenda.
In this regard, development cooperation plays a significant role. This is also reflected in Germany’s
policy agenda.

4. The huge differences between Europe and Africa with regard to income, education standards, job perspectives, health care, and future options – especially for the youth – will exist for a very long time; they will continue to push Africans to migrate. For African countries, creating stable states and improving job prospects, for example, are of course key tasks. It will not, however, reduce migration. On the contrary, more Africans will look to leave their countries in order to raise
income and enhance their prospects. This should be reflected in a German cooperation agenda.
What is needed is a long-term strategy that is in line with those studies that focus on structural
change, fostering industrialization, and higher productivity in agriculture. Rural–urban migration
without employment prospects will create unrest and social and political instability. The rise of the
informal sector in urban areas is not the solution for African urban poverty. Petty trade and services
are a result of change without modernization and industrialization. Most informal sector
enterprises do not grow. Supporting the integration of African SMEs into global and regional value
chains is one of the activities that might help African enterprises to grow and offer more
employment opportunities.

5. While the demographic dividend can be seen to be potentially large, it can only be achieved if
the burgeoning working-age population is gainfully employed and if the predicted boost in savings
(and thus investment) is realized. However, meeting these two conditions is not trivial and requires
sound policies that support human capital accumulation and maintain stable and enabling political
and economic environments. Given sub-Saharan Africa’s relatively very high unemployment rates,
there is substantial scope for further growth by engaging the unemployed and underemployed.

6. Germany has economic interests and should therefore concentrate its agenda on the most
important democratic middle powers – let us say South Africa, Nigeria, and some states in East
Africa. In order to deepen cooperation with these states, it should look to establish strategic
partnership agreements on industrialization, raw materials, trade, technology, student exchange,
and sustainability.

7. There is a dire need for security cooperation. Germany has no security interests of its own in
Africa, but it has an interest in peace and stability (fight against terrorism, failing of states, civil wars). This means no ad hocism regarding military intervention, but rather long-term support for an African security agenda developed by the African countries themselves.

8. The Federal Foreign Office is the main actor in Germany’s Africa cooperation and is tasked
with leading, and developing a more coherent agenda. Increased coherence between departments
and institutions will improve both the efficiency of resource use and the credibility of Germany’s
Africa policy, which has tended to feature too many voices and to sometimes even function as an
ancillary foreign policy.

9. African countries are in need of new cooperation formats (e.g., on technology, education,
research cooperation, security, culture, energy, employment, and industrial development).
Germany’s actors – namely, the state, NGOs, business, and cultural institutions, inter alia – should
engage at different levels with African partners.

10. Germany’s Africa policy should not get caught in a geostrategic trap – that is, a new
scramble for Africa with China, India, the United States, and the European Union. This should be
avoided with adequate means, such as strengthening African institutions, participation, and
democracy and supporting all activities that avoid war and state decay. If German policy on Africa
intends to create a successful symbiosis to the advantage of both sides, then universal values such
as freedom, solidarity, justice, human rights, the rule of law, and democracy should converge with
the mutual and reciprocal interests of Germany and its African partner countries. Only a genuine
declaration of motives and political and economic interests will foster trust and create a resilient
basis on which international cooperation can be developed between Germany and its potential
African partners.
A partnership with Africa that is characterized by symmetry and equality, rather than the
conventional donor–recipient logic, requires that African states and players take explicit
responsibility for their political actions.