Beitrag vom 13.06.2013

Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)

Discussion Paper 9/2013

Towards Renewal or Oblivion?

Prospects for Post-2020 Cooperation between the European Union and the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group

Mario Negre
Niels Keijzer
Brecht Lein
Nicola Tissi

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Conclusions and recommendations for further debate

Europeans present two approaches to the future of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement -
one that abandons the ACP-EU partnership, and the other that preserves some of its elements.
The first approach has a weak rationale for keeping a common framework with
these very heterogeneous regions, which do not appear to have developed an ACP-identity
or intra-ACP trade. Europeans point to the decreasing relevance of former colonial ties,
particularly in the context of an enlarged EU, but also because of the ACP-EU emphasis
on ODA, combined with the ACP Group's poor track record in helping to shape joint positions
and interventions at international fora.

That said, European stakeholders find that there are three main elements worth retaining:
(i) the CPA's legally binding nature that promotes political dialogue, predictability and
ownership strategy in development cooperation; (ii) the European Development Fund,
which has a relatively strong record of performance (compared with other EU development
cooperation instruments) and a commendable multi-stakeholder approach to designing
and managing development strategies; and (iii) the potential alliance of the ACP and
the EU for global public-goods provision. Although several EU Member States, the EC
and the European Parliament have called for ‘budgetising' the EDF, our findings suggest
that the EU would gain from ‘EDF-ising' its other development cooperation instruments
by including innovations developed in the ACP-EU context. However, there should be
democratic scrutiny of the EDF by the European Parliament.

Although there is no official position of the EU or its Member States about what should
happen after Cotonou expires, European actors seem to favour a more regional approach
to EU external relations and also maintaining the valuable aspects of the present setup.
Although the EU's strategic interest in the Caribbean and especially in the Pacific is clearly
declining, EU Member States' repudiation of the CPA could seriously impact promotion
of their values and interests in Africa. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy does not provide
a viable alternative framework for cooperation.

The EU seems inclined to preserve key elements of the CPA in a ‘light' version of the
current ACP-EU agreement - either by transferring them into separate EU regional strategies
toward Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, or by combining them into a simple
overarching ‘ACP light' structure with regional strategies. European policy discussions on
this matter are long overdue, with preparations for the CPA's third revision in 2015 potentially
serving as an important ‘warming up session' for negotiations on post-2020. EPA
negotiations have negatively affected ACP-EU relations in the recent past and could harm
the EU's position and trade with Africa in the medium to long term.

While the ACP countries' official representatives in Brussels support continuing the Cotonou
Agreement and also upgrading the ACP Group's international profile, stakeholders in
ACP countries are not enthusiastic. Our ten country visits identified five key reasons for
this restraint.

First, a sizeable ‘social disconnect' exists between the structures and inner circles involved
with the Cotonou Agreement's functioning, the ACP Brussels-based actors and the ACP
countries. Although this is not unusual for such an agreement, it is telling that relevant
stakeholders from government, civil society, the private sector, international organisations
and academia don't really value Cotonou's scope and reach. Important differences about
the ACP-EU exist across regions, countries and stakeholders, indicating the value of more
discussions about how ACP countries might shape future cooperation with the EU. States
that are party to the Cotonou Agreement appear to have largely outsourced the CPA's
management to a select group of international experts, diplomats and representatives - to
the ACP's Brussels-based Secretariat and the ACP states' national missions to the EU. As
a result, many well-informed, relevant stakeholders in these countries may know about
EPAs and EDF development interventions, but also be completely unaware of their governing
ACP-EU partnership.

Second, while the ACP Group is regarded as historically relevant, there is little appreciation
of its current value beyond securing EU development assistance through the Cotonou
Agreement, and to help the Caribbean and Pacific regions amplify their messages to the
EU and internationally. Obviously, the Group's size in itself could be an important reason
to maintain it, especially if this power were used with the EU to create an automatic majority
in international fora. However, since the Group has little to show in this regard, size
alone does not make a convincing rationale.

Third, the overlapping mandates, memberships and international strategies among the different
organisations and frameworks seem to conflict. Increased bilateral relations vis-à-vis
traditional EU partners, the rising role of RECs and the tensions that result from overlapping
memberships, as well as competition for remits between the regional (RECs), continental
(AU) and ACP levels, are just some of the conflictual interactions that affect the Group.

Fourth, although the institutions emanating from the CPA were ambitiously designed, the
ACP's low financial commitment is interpreted as a sign of its lacking political will. Shortcomings of the current leadership - as compared with the first decades of the ACP-EU
framework - are also regarded as explanations for the ACP's decreasing relevance. Compounding
this is the negligible intra-ACP cooperation and trade - or other substantial links.

Fifth, EPAs negotiations have especially tarnished the EU's image at the country level,
where the CPA's trade pillar is its best-known component and dissatisfaction is expressed
about issues of both process and content. Most ACP interlocutors claim that the EU has
pushed its own interest-based agenda, disregarding the ACP countries' key concerns and
insisting on speed despite the lack of any agreement. The ACP countries most fear the loss
of custom revenues, competition from EU industries, and lack of supply-side capacity to
access EU markets - combined with possible damage to their local economies from the
Singapore Issues. Real or perceived, sound or not, the EU's approach to trade negotiation
has inspired the Group's mistrust.

All this notwithstanding, EDF money is generally appreciated - even if there is little consensus
about how it should be targeted. While most interviewees acknowledge that EDFfunded
interventions are important for development, many also are disappointed that cooperation
has remained so government-oriented despite the acknowledgement of the partnership's
multiple actors. EU development cooperation is broadly viewed as taking alignment
seriously, and the EU's basic values are broadly shared.

ACP stakeholders generally view the values that the EU seeks to promote through political
dialogue as universal and feel that Cotonou is an important instrument for insuring mutual
accountability. Stakeholders view the political dialogue as mostly one-sided, although
they recognise that they have managed to raise concern for some of their values, for instance
how EU Member States treat ACP migrants. The problem does not seem to be the
values themselves but rather the way the EU promotes them, as well as its choice of the
right time to intervene. Despite these criticisms, ACP stakeholders agree that political dialogue
is important for fostering civil society participation in the development process, and
many insist that much more should be done. However, all parties agree that the EU civil
society consultations in ACP countries are not well done and the CSOs' access to EDF
funds is inadequate.

ACP-EU relations are deeply affected by emerging economies' growing role in ACP
countries, which impacts trade relations by creating the impression that European exports
and services are less competitive than those from China, and also increases competition
for access to natural resources. Important economic fluxes from China - and to a lesser
degree from other emerging nations, too - that apparently have no strings attached, are
reducing the significance of EU development funds and limiting the EU's position to promote
the values addressed in the political dialogue (Hackenesch 2013).

The EU has already lost, or is in the process of losing, its status as a privileged partner for
many ACP countries - and vice-versa. Any future cooperation agreement should be less
government-focused and more flexible and opportunistic about identifying a few concrete
areas to drive cooperation. While Cotonou's contractual nature is appreciated, its vast
framework for cooperation distracts from more down-to-earth agreements like those that
ACP countries have happily made with other countries like the BRICS. ACP stakeholders
insist, however, that these new modes of cooperation should not be taken as encouragement
for the EU to become like the BRICS: the European approach to cooperating, along
with the way practices have been shaped over decades, is much valued.

The growing absolute and relative size of EDFs, as well as the contentious nature of and
slow progress with the CPA trade and political pillars, have caused development cooperation
to eclipse the ACP-EU partnership. Not only has this hampered Cotonou's potential
to be a strong and broad Partnership Agreement, but it also eliminates the possibility of a
post-2020 ‘status quo' because the EU's development assistance to ACP countries is being
reduced. Cooperation should be expanded beyond development in view of the strong
interest in and potential of cooperation in areas such as trade, investment and knowledge
exchange.

ACP stakeholder perceptions concerning the future of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement
sketch out three possible scenarios for ACP-EU relations:

• Abandoning the Cotonou Agreement as a legal framework and focusing EU relations
on each of the ACP regions (which will happen automatically if no successor agreement
to Cotonou is adopted);
• Upgrading the Cotonou Agreement beyond 2020 by fundamentally changing the
ACP-EU institutions to a lighter - less ODA-focused - cooperation architecture; or
• Regionalising the ties while preserving as many elements of the Cotonou Agreement
as possible and maintaining the ACP to coordinate certain international fora and for
cooperation in technical, developmental or trade matters.

While European interlocutors generally seem to favour the first option of regionalising the
EU strategies and simply turning the page on the Cotonou Agreement, attitudes within the
ACP are more diverse. ACP officials and ACP country ambassadors in Brussels, as well
as others involved in operating the current framework, broadly support upgrading the
CPA. However, most country stakeholders see no reason to maintain either an ACP structure
or the CPA, and opt for letting Cotonou expire, regionalising relations with the EU,
and possibly maintaining a simple ACP structure. Regardless of their preferred scenario,
stakeholders acknowledge the need for an in-depth assessment of the political and technical
feasibility of all the options.

One key aspect appears to be shared, namely the conviction that some key elements of the
Cotonou Agreement - particularly regarding development cooperation and political dialogue,
and to a lesser extent, the trade pillar - should be preserved and improved. So the
question is how to regionalise and also incorporate key CPA aspects into regional strategies
vis-à-vis the EU. Few believe that much can be achieved in this regard before Cotonou expires.
In fact, this will probably be one of the main considerations in the countdown to 2020.

The social disconnect observed between the institutions and functioning of the Cotonou
Agreement, and their intended Partnership shows that relevant EU and ACP country
stakeholders should be more involved in the decision process that is slowly taking shape:
the debate must be expanded beyond the inner CPA circles. This research shows how relevant
stakeholders from the field of international relations, government, the private sector,
CSOs and others are often disconnected from decisions about their status, shape or future
development. Regardless of the direction that ACP-EU relations take, the more open and
participatory the process, the better the chances of achieving a meaningful outcome.

Although the seven years to 2020 might seem long, the ACP and the EU must stop being
preoccupied with structures and groupings and urgently launch discussions that are driven
by specific cooperation concerns. The ACP's Group of Eminent Persons does not provide
the solution, but it could help promote what is really needed: a multi-stakeholder bottomup
review of the partnership in ACP countries.

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