African values that hinder development?

Rainer Gruszczynski wrote an article on this topic in the blog “der Freitag” on July 14, 2017 (see below or here in the “News” section).

Is his account accurate? What conclusions should development cooperation draw from this?
You can enter your opinion below, at the end of the article.

Values, leadership, development in Africa

Development aid fails because African values are hardly taken into account. This can only be achieved with leaders of integrity who make themselves independent of development aid.

A blog post by Freitag community member COTRANGA

The successes of development aid in and for Africa since the 1960s have remained very modest to this day. Experts agree on this, as they do on the fact that corruption and fraud among the local elites are particularly responsible for this. However, some critics of development aid – including development practitioners Danner (2012) and Haushalter (2010) in Germany – also point out that the aid granted to Africa is of little benefit there because it is based on concepts that predominantly transport Western values into African culture and do not take African thinking sufficiently into account. African experts, such as the Senegalese economist Felwine Sarr, express similar views. It is unacceptable for Africa to simply “reproduce” the history of the West. Instead, Africans must “reinvent” their culture, taking their pre-colonial values into account. Furthermore, in his book Afrotopia (2016), he even rejects the Western concept of “development” for Africa because it discriminates against African culture.

Traditional African values have recently been made known to a wider public, primarily under the term Ubuntu. The term Ubuntu originates from the South African language area and stands for a philosophy of sharing, community spirit, practiced humanity, but also the primacy of the spiritual over the material and respect for nature. In the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa and later in the politics of national unity, Ubuntu found prominent advocates in Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu, among others. They associated it with the hope of bringing peace to the country at the Cape, indeed of creating a “rainbow nation.”

It should be emphasized, however, that the values, attitudes, and mindsets embodied by Ubuntu are by no means unique to South Africa, but, as Etounga-Manguelle (2000) points out, are found throughout sub-Saharan Africa and, in many respects, also in North Africa. They are based on a common spiritual foundation that has been handed down over centuries. Thabo Mbeki, Mandela's successor as South African president, referred to this in the 1990s when he called on the continent's elites to bring about an African renaissance, in the course of which traditional African values would once again be given greater prominence in all African countries. Since then, many Africans have hoped that the humanistic-ecological approach of their pre-colonial ethics will pave the way for development on their continent that will enable its citizens to shape their own destiny, rather than making them appear as victims of their history and of “humanitarian colonialism” (Perry, 2015).

The value of “community” has an outstanding influence on the development of the African continent. Unlike in the West, where the promotion and development of the individual are at the center of socialization, in the thinking and actions of Africans, the individual is less important as a person than as a member of a family, village, clan, or ethnic group. He is bound to these systems throughout his life by duties of loyalty because, according to traditional beliefs, they have made him a fully-fledged human being. In return, the individual feels obliged to subordinate his or her individual rights to collective rights throughout his or her life. Such systemic constellations have proven their worth in African history because the groups superior to the individual – family, clan, village – have facilitated his or her survival. And they still do so today. But the system also works in the opposite direction. Even if African migrants live on welfare abroad, they regularly send money to their relatives or their home village in amounts that exceed the total development aid for the whole of Africa. And they do this not only to thank them for financing their escape, for example, but because they continue to feel part of their community of origin, which they expect to continue to protect them in the future – with the help of their common ancestors! And of which they want to remain a part, even after death.

This feeling of connection, obligation, and gratitude of the individual toward a higher-value community is a valuable part of the humanistic DNA in sub-Saharan Africa. However, thinking, feeling, and acting in this way also has serious disadvantages. This makes it almost impossible for Africans who earn an income in the economy, politics, or administration of their home country to escape the demands for support from members of their extended family or village. They repeatedly urge their materially better-off “neighbors” to share their “wealth” with them (distribution obligation). Or, if they are entrepreneurs, they demand that they hire members of their extended family. However, the hiring criterion is not the applicant's qualifications, but their relationship to the boss. In this nepotism, entrepreneurs cannot dismiss relatives once they have been hired, or can only do so with great difficulty, even if they have proven to be incapable or even unwilling to perform the tasks assigned to them. The pressure from their community of origin, to which individuals feel connected throughout their lives, even if they are rational entrepreneurs, is enormous. And they often feel unable to withstand it. This makes it very difficult for African entrepreneurs to accumulate the capital necessary to secure or even grow their businesses. Many entrepreneurs therefore feel compelled to leave their home region to escape the pressure and economic failure. Bartholomäus Grill (2005) described this type of growth inhibitor as the “African disease.”

This problem is exacerbated by the fact that envy among members of the extended family often slows down the success of their “neighbors” – and thus also the emergence of a middle class! Those who do not share are threatened with witchcraft. Fear of this is widespread. Even among successful, educated people who live in cities. Therefore, as Danner points out, the saying common in the “economy of witchcraft” – “You behead what grows too fast” – should be taken seriously.

However, this problem is not limited to businesses and lower and middle social strata. Even at the highest levels of politics and administration in Africa, a misguided sense of solidarity, fostered by tradition, regularly gives rise to nepotism and clientelism. Ministers often have to provide benefits to an entire clan. This places an enormous strain on productivity in government, administration, and the economy, indeed on the democratic institutions of an African country as a whole. Time and again, it becomes known that ministers in a government block each other's work simply because they belong to different ethnic groups. Or it becomes apparent that a government is bloated solely so that the various ethnic groups can be represented and their interests balanced. Volker Seitz recently pointed out that the current government in Ghana, which is considered a model African country, had 110 ministers in 2017, who are not only well paid, but also have two official cars and an official villa with staff at their disposal free of charge.

Even more critical, however, is the fact that in African states, subsystems such as villages or ethnic groups, which may be characterized by remarkable solidarity within themselves, very often clearly distinguish themselves from foreign communities. The narrow understanding of identity underlying this behavior can lead to xenophobia, tribal feuds, or even civil wars. But even at a less aggressive level, this attitude proves to be highly problematic because, as described above, loyalties to friends and members of the extended family or the same ethnic group very often outweigh loyalties to rational requirements in Africa. This obstacle to development is further exacerbated when the needs of “strangers” are represented, especially by white people who come from a different world.

Furthermore, the narrow understanding of identity encourages the practice of granting perpetrators immunity from punishment after criminal acts. This attitude is by no means solely attributable to the aversion to conflict that is conspicuous in African culture. The main factor here is that the accused, simply because he or she is a member of a community, is protected by that community. The community shows solidarity with its “brother” (or “sister”) simply because it identifies with the accused and consequently sees itself as accused as well.

When a culture of forgiveness is expressed in the work of truth commissions after the end of apartheid in South Africa or in the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda, this may contribute to the pacification of society. “Nevertheless,” as the Cameroonian philosopher Achille Mbembe points out in an insightful analysis of postcolonial Africa (2010), “concern for reconciliation alone cannot replace the radical demand for justice.” But from the perspective of economic progress, does this statement not apply equally to “normal” criminal acts? Is it not sending the wrong signal to perpetrators and society as a whole when corruption and fraud go unpunished?

Questions of this kind arise in particular when the perpetrators are politicians or members of other elites who have been proven guilty of fraud and corruption on a large scale. The current president of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, who recently, when accused of corruption, publicly pointed out that this practice is part of African culture, has so far been able to benefit personally from this attitude with impunity. Other African politicians – including kleptocrats and dictators of the Mugabe ilk – also have nothing to fear from their colleagues in the African Union, because: “Your brother is your brother, even if he stinks” (quoted from Danner, 2012).

Unfortunately, many Western donor organizations now also tolerate the practice of impunity: A few years ago, for example, it became known that a Tanzanian bishop had been guilty of fraud by using a considerable amount of aid money received from the Swiss church for private purposes. The Swiss church refrained from prosecuting him on the grounds that the bishop had many supplicants from his extended family to provide for. Large and small “humanitarian” organizations in donor countries behave in a similar manner, thereby supporting behavior among recipients that runs counter to development.

Even if the aforementioned problems have their origins in traditional African thinking, describing them does not justify questioning the underlying philosophy as a whole. At most, any “romanticization” (Fröchtling, 2012) of traditional African value systems—including Ubuntu and the African Renaissance—as is even practiced in the West today, should be countered by pointing out their dark sides. However, it is essential to ask whether traditional values and behaviors are compatible with the kind of development that the West propagates for Africa and exemplifies as a “model,” or whether development based on the Western model actually corresponds to the wishes of African populations. And even if Africans were to take the development of their countries into their own hands, they would have to clarify what role their traditions could play in this and what price they would be willing to pay if they wanted to achieve Western standards of development.

The answers to such questions would have to be preceded by a discourse in society, politics, and the economy of the respective country in Africa, in which the alternatives and their consequences for those affected are presented. This is especially true since it involves questioning or relativizing values that are generally accepted in Africa. If one wanted to get the population on board—and this is essential if one wants to implement political and social changes—it would have to be debated publicly. This could also take place under the palaver tree, as is already not only desired by politicians in democratic Botswana, but is even already practiced in the villages.

At this point, it becomes clear that development is not just a technical and economic problem, as Western “experts” often want us to believe, but a socio-political project. It must be clear to all those involved that there is no such thing as development without collateral damage! Industrialization and the capitalist economy have also taken their toll in rich countries. There, too, they have accelerated a shift in values and fundamentally changed the lives of citizens in families and other social systems—in work and leisure, in politics and economics—leading to sometimes painful upheavals. To name just a few examples from the European context, consider the emancipation of women and the associated change in the roles of men in the family and in public life, the shift or dismantling of authority, anonymity in cities, ecological problems, the strengthening of individual or democratically elected decision-makers at the expense of families and authorities, the socialization of individual duties towards the elderly and the sick, the increase in crime when traditional social structures that regulate behavior – villages, communities – are weakened, stress in the workplace, changes in education in families and institutions, and so on and so forth...

Such changes, or similar ones affecting everyday life, can only be brought about within Africa itself, after discussion between those affected. It is therefore worth remembering what the first president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, wrote half a century ago to his continent and Africa's “helpers”: “People and countries cannot be developed from outside. They can only develop themselves.” But that means that development experts must come from the countries and regions concerned themselves. And they should not only be responsible for formulating goals and measures. They must also be accountable to the people there for the results of their efforts, including failures – this must not be overlooked.

If African governments were to take up this challenge, they could take into account the historically grown models of “their” societies in their concepts much more convincingly than ‘experts’ from rich industrialized donor countries have done – “models on which all development is based” (Danner). If they deem it necessary, African leaders could, above all, advocate much more credibly than these “experts” for the traditional ideas of “their” society to be adapted to the requirements of the present. In this way, they could perhaps even help to preserve the “warmth of home” that Africans expect from their communities of origin and which is in danger of being lost in Western concepts.
However, for such a policy to succeed, it would need to be championed by charismatic leaders who, above all, have integrity and are in close contact with the people of their country. They would then serve as models for a fundamental change in mentality in Africa that would favor reform, because the people in the cities and villages would believe in them and identify with them. Citizens could even be proud of a country represented by such leaders. In other words, these leaders would embody the opposite of the currently ruling African elites, who enrich themselves, whom no one trusts, and who do not care about the poor.

Leaders of this caliber who fostered a sense of identity included Nelson Mandela and Thomas Sankara, who vehemently fought corruption in Burkina Faso and led a modest life even as president of his country. Julius Nyerere should also be mentioned here. Leaders of this caliber could encourage the people of Africa to feel a sense of belonging to a nation with which they feel connected because their family, village, and ethnic group have a respected place there. This would not only expand the identity of Africans, but also facilitate a balance of the particular interests of traditional communities in favor of a focus on national projects. This would also be a step toward overcoming the obstacles described above, which are imposed on individuals by extended families and other social systems when they want to develop personally and economically. Today, a sense of national unity in African countries is evident at best when the national soccer team plays or when people talk about the injustices of slavery and colonization suffered in the past.

However, if an honest president of an African country wanted to implement credible and efficient policies for his country, he would be dependent on his government team, the judiciary, and the public administration also being committed to the principle of integrity. The process this would set in motion would, however, very quickly require the country to gradually become independent of development aid. This is because foreign aid payments in Africa have been shown to fuel corruption and fraud in government, administration, the judiciary, and the economy. And it has also been shown to reduce their efficiency. The transition could be made easier for countries by taking small steps, giving the government and administration the opportunity to gradually adapt to the new situation. Such a government would also accompany the transition with reforms in administration, the legal system, and the economy, thereby creating the framework for more jobs and income-generating investments to come into the country, albeit with a delay. The donor countries could then support this process, for example, by offering the reformers increased technical assistance – if desired – and by massively promoting the establishment of job-creating joint ventures.

The otherwise enigmatic President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, has proven that a gradual phase-out of development aid makes sense. Within 10 years, Kagame has managed to turn Rwanda into one of Africa's strongest and most visibly growing economies. This is despite, or rather because of, the fact that he has reduced foreign contributions to the national budget from 85% to 41% during this period. He sees widespread growing prosperity as a way to free Rwandans from hatred and envy, and he hopes that this will give rise to a Rwandan patriotism among Hutus and Tutsis alike, uniting the two ethnic groups for the good of the whole country (cf. Perry. 2015).

Even during the phase of phasing out development aid, Africans would not only finance their own projects themselves. Above all, they would be able to design and implement them on their own responsibility, taking into account their traditional values on the ground. And then they would already have to be accountable to their taxpayers. Under such conditions, it would be more likely than today that existing resources would be managed sensibly. In this context, it is worth noting that during the period when development aid payments rose steadily, growth in recipient countries declined; but when significantly less aid money flowed to Africa after the end of the Cold War, economic performance there began to increase again. This was noted by Oxford professor Paul Collier (2007) and poverty researcher and Nobel Prize winner Angus Deaton (2013). Doing away with foreign aid would therefore not only make it clear that development is something that is initiated within African countries. In addition, the resulting reduction in corruption and fraud could enhance the reputation of state representatives and, incidentally, improve the chances that government officials and the judiciary will eventually do their jobs. That alone would be a huge success!

If such leaders were also able to succeed, as Sarr demands, in bringing their populations along with them in the “reinvention of African culture,” they would be in a position to encourage their citizens to discover and accept themselves as “responsible actors” who are themselves responsible for improving living conditions in their countries. In this way, according to Sarr, they could regain their dignity. Furthermore, this could help people overcome the alienation from themselves experienced during colonization, which Sarr and Mbembe describe so impressively. What is more, it could pave the way for an African development model that would allow African societies to break away from the real or imagined cultural dominance of the West, as the Indian poverty researcher and Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen (2010) wishes for the countries of the South. For they would have the choice to decide which Western “achievements” (values, behaviors, techniques, institutions...) or which traditional elements they would like to retain or adopt because they have proven themselves and can also be used to survive in a “newly invented” society.
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Addendum: It is doubtful today that African governments such as Kagame's will voluntarily make themselves independent of development aid funds. After all, who would voluntarily forego gifts when they are often virtually forced upon them, as in the case of development aid? A corresponding initiative would therefore have to come from the current donor countries. An announced gradual withdrawal of Western aid payments would certainly be the best way forward. However, according to Deaton (2013), for example, a complete cessation of financial support is not to be expected in the foreseeable future. This is because, in addition to humanitarian considerations, other factors unrelated to development also play a role in foreign payments to African countries, such as the political influence of donor countries and securing their access to raw materials through bilateral agreements, or the unwillingness of organizations in the development aid industry to make themselves redundant. Deaton therefore proposes, as an alternative to discontinuing aid payments to African developing countries, a package of measures aimed at significantly reducing the direct flow of money to Africa, but which nevertheless, or precisely because of this, strengthen the economies there and benefit the populations. Mbembe's proposal to expand the definition of “crimes against humanity” and to bring governments to international justice in serious cases of corruption and plundering of their country's natural resources is also interesting. Perhaps this could actually persuade African governments to renounce the misappropriation of development aid funds.
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Since 2006, Rainer Gruszczynski has been working for non-profit organizations as an initiator, supervisor, and controller of development aid projects in West Africa. As part of his COTRANGA initiative (www.cotranga.de) and as an advisor to the Social Business Foundation, he is now primarily committed to credit-based aid. Rainer Gruszczynski is a member of the Bonn Appeal, an association of experienced practitioners of development aid in Africa from the fields of science, business, and politics who advocate for a decisive change of course in development policy. He is also involved in the Society for International Development, Hamburg (SID).