Beitrag vom 13.07.2020

Graensengrenzen

Development Policy Made in BMZ 2030

Thomas Bonschab and Robert Kappel

In the Strategy Department of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), heads must be spinning. Following the Marshall Plan, the many special initiatives, the Corona emergency programme, now the reform concept „BMZ 2030“, with which the ministry also wants to position itself on a European level.

At the heart of the reform is the distinction between bilateral partners, especially reform and transformation partners, global partners and nexus and peace partners. In concrete terms, this means reducing official bilateral cooperation from 85 to 60 countries.

At first glance, everything sounds quite plausible. One wants to use the available funds more strategically. Who would not want that? The ministry wants to increase the political steering capability and no longer operate development cooperation according to the watering can principle. Check. And, of course, it wants to coordinate better with our European neighbours, especially while it holds the Council Presidency. This is to avoid that everyone is pursuing the same or, worse, completely contradictory programmes.

However, doubts about this rhetoric are more than appropriate. It all starts with the fact that one can hardly imagine Minister Müller calling his European counterparts after all these years and suggesting: „You do more health, we do business“ or „You do Sierra Leone, we had enough“. It is more likely that these were rather self-sufficient decisions of the ministry.

In general, communication does not seem to be the shining example of the BMZ reform. Many on the list of goodbye countries have apparently learned indirectly that they will not be bilateral partners of the BMZ in future.

It is true that currently no head of department can travel to deliver the message himself and at the same time open up further options for cooperation. But it should not be an excuse for taking a unilateral decision that is out of proportion to a „dialogue at eye level“, as recently called for by EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen for Africa.

Such a dialogue at eye level would require that one accepts that the respective interests are generally contradictory, that one is therefore rubbing up against them, but that in the end one nevertheless finds a compromise with which both sides can live. That would be the way to a „Strategic Partnership“, as is being lived with China, India and ultimately even the USA.

The BMZ is taking a different path here with „BMZ 2030“. Rather following the old model of the World Bank and IMF, it defines standards, especially in the area of good governance, and ensures that in the event of non-compliance, the aim is to avoid being taken for a ride. Sounds self-confident, but is rather helpless. After all, from a German perspective, most DC recipient countries do not seem important enough for the formulation of genuine self-interest, which would have to be negotiated in dialogue.

Other countries do things differently. Above all China. It literally takes your breath away when the ever ongoing complaints about Germany’s geopolitical loss of importance vis-à-vis China are heard in ministerial circles and in the NGO scene, especially in Africa, while at the same time the BMZ is writing a welcome letter to Beijing. China does not even have to compete to fill the gap in the countries that the BMZ is currently tearing down.

In any case, it is questionable why Germany is cutting the very instrument it is envied for by the rest of the world. No other country has built up comparable external structures and trust among local partners worldwide over decades, which the BMZ has made possible in parallel to the rapidly rotating embassy staff. This is a unique pool of knowledge. Certainly, it should be brought closer to political and economic interests and in a world beyond development cooperation than has been the case so far. But to dismantle the bridges of bilateral relations is negligent for a country as globally dependent as Germany.

Moreover, with the „BMZ 2030“ reform programme, it will be difficult for the BMZ to arouse enthusiasm for a development cooperation that wants to push forward a European venture, and in doing so take advantage of Germany’s unique selling points.

It does not yet seem to have gotten around in the German Government that the world and the world of development cooperation have changed. The „BMZ 2030“ offers nothing new, just disguises it as a 2030 future model. It does not anticipate geopolitical change, which requires different responses.